We provide empirical evidence on the extent to which long-term care insurance affects the housing and living arrangements of the elderly by examining plausibly exogenous changes in the supply of long-term care insurance through the Medicare program that occurred in the late 1990s. Prior to 1997, Medicare reimbursed home health care agencies on a retrospective-cost basis. Then, starting in October, 1997, as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97), Medicare switched to a system of prospective payments for home health care, which induced state-by-calendar-year variation in the supply of this type of public long-term care insurance.
Introduction
As the American population ages and end-of-life medical costs rise, there is growing interest in insurance markets for long-term care. Because the private market for such insurance is small, and the publicly provided insurance in the form of Medicaid only covers older individuals who are sufficiently poor, particular attention has been placed on increasing coverage through tax incentives and the expansion of existing programs.
Housing economists should be keenly interested in long-term care insurance for at least four reasons. First, unlike many other goods, there is a close link between functional status, health, and housing decisions, especially among older individuals (Engelhardt, 2005) . In particular, housing and health are likely complements in consumption. Given the great desire of the elderly to live independently and age in place, long-term care insurance, which transfers resources from healthy to sick states of the world, may allow older individuals to stay in their homes longer, thus raising elderly homeownership rates. Second, such insurance provides a funding source for the purchase of market-based services that may substitute for home-produced, informal care. This may attenuate the incidence of shared living arrangements and influence household-formation decisions among the elderly, key determinants of housing demand. Third, because housing wealth can be used to self-insure against long-term care expenditures, there are direct linkages between motives for and the timing of housing wealth decumulation and the demand for long-term care insurance, as well as other actuarial products, such as private annuities and reverse mortgages (Davidoff, 2008a (Davidoff, , 2008b . Finally, housing wealth receives favorable treatment in means-tested social insurance programs targeted to the aged, particularly Medicaid, the primary insurer against large long-term care expenses. Therefore, the structure of public long-term care insurance may influence the relative demand for housing assets.
Whereas there is a voluminous literature in urban and public economics on housing decisions, there has been remarkably little recent housing research on the elderly in general, and even less on the impact of long-term care on elderly housing decisions in particular. 1 The small 2 existing empirical housing literature on the elderly has focused primarily on the extent to which the elderly decumulate housing equity as they age (e.g., Merill, 1984; Feinstein and McFadden, 1989; Reschovsky, 1990; Shilling, 1997, 1999; Venti and Wise, 1989 , 1990 , 2000 , 2001 and analyses of the potential market for reverse mortgages (Mayer and Simons, 1994; Kutty, 1998; Venti and Wise, 1991; among others) . An important exception is the recent work of Davidoff (2008a Davidoff ( , 2008b , who has begun to explore the interplay between housing wealth and the demand for long-term care insurance and annuities.
The primary aim of the current paper is to provide empirical evidence on the first two topics above: the extent to which long-term care insurance affects the housing and living arrangements of the elderly. 2 Because the decisions to purchase private long-term care insurance and housing are almost surely jointly determined, we do not focus on the market for private insurance. Instead, we attempt to identify the impact on housing and living arrangements by examining plausibly exogenous changes in the supply of public long-term care insurance through the Medicare program that occurred in the late 1990's. Specifically, Medicare-the primary insurer for acute care among those 65 and older-reimburses expenditures for home health care, which is long-term care delivered in a home setting. Unlike Medicaid, Medicare eligibility is not means-tested.
Prior to 1997, Medicare reimbursed home health care agencies on a retrospective-cost basis. In 1996, for example, 15% of 75-84 year olds and 26% of those 85 and older received home health care benefits, and expenditure represented 10% of total Medicare program payments. Then, starting in October, 1997, as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97), Medicare switched to a system of prospective payments for home health care. This resulted in a 30% decline in Medicare expenditures on home health care and a substantial decline in home health care use. Importantly, up through 2000, the new prospective payment system was implemented in a way that effectively differed across states, so that the 1997 law induced state-by-calendar-year variation in the supply of this type of public long-term care insurance.
We exploit this variation to econometrically identify the impact on the housing and living arrangements of the elderly, using data on over 57,000 elderly families from 1995-2000 (before and after the law change) from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS).
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There are three primary findings. First, our estimates indicate that increases in home health care benefits decrease the incidence of shared living arrangements among the elderly: the elasticity of shared living to benefits is −0.7 over all elderly and −1 for widowed elderly.
Second, there was little impact on household headship among the elderly. This suggests that the bulk of the shared-living response occurred through co-residents living in elderly households (and not the reverse). Finally, there is some, but weak, evidence that increases in benefits raised elderly homeownership, with an elasticity of 0.2 for all elderly. Overall, the results suggest that future expansions in public benefits have the potential to alter elderly housing and living arrangements significantly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives background on long-term care, Medicare home health benefits, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Section III discusses findings from the previous literature. Section IV describes the CPS and the construction of the analysis dataset. It draws on some of the methods and exposition developed in a companion set of papers on the impact of Social Security on the elderly by Engelhardt (2008) , Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) and Gruber (2005, 2006) . Section V charts the timeseries evolution of elderly living arrangements, headship, and homeownership during the period of study. Sections VI and VII discuss the regression framework and estimation results, respectively. The paper ends with a summary of findings, a discussion of caveats, and directions for future research.
II. Background
Broadly speaking, long-term care can be defined as the receipt of assistance or help with at least one Activity of Daily Living (ADL)-bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and getting in and out of bed-or one Instrumental Activity of Daily Living (IADL)-using a telephone, taking medication, handling money, shopping, and preparing meals. Under this definition, of 34.5 million individuals 65 and older, there were 5.5 million receiving long-term care in 1999, of which only 30% were institutionalized (United States Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, 2004) . In addition to informal care provided by family and friends, there are three main classes of formal providers of long-term care for the elderly: nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home health care agencies. In 2001, just after our sample period, long-term care spending represented 12.2% of all U.S. health care spending, and was financed 48.3% by Medicaid, which is public health insurance for the poor, 14.2% by Medicare, which is public health insurance for the aged, 22% by out-of-pocket payments, 9.6% by private insurance, and 5.9% through other means (United States Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, 2004) .
While Medicaid traditionally has always been the primary source of funding for such expenditures, Medicare experienced rapid growth in the 1990's in expenditures on long-term care administered in the form of home health care benefits, which cover care by a certified home health care agency in the residence of a home-bound individual if intermittent or part-time skilled nursing or other therapy is necessary. Importantly, although a physician-approved treatment plan is required, there are no limitations on the duration of these benefits, and no deductibles or co-payments. In an effort to control rapidly rising costs, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97) mandated that Medicare move from a retrospective to a prospective payment system (PPS) for home health care agencies by 2000.
From 1997-2000, Medicare instituted an interim prospective payment system (IPS), in which each agency's reimbursement was capped annually, based on a weighted average of the agency's 1994 average cost (75% weight) and the 1994 Census division's average cost (25% weight). The IPS had the effect of changing reimbursement rates differentially across time and location according to the (pre-determined) cost structure in 1994. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the introduction of the IPS substantially reduced Medicare home health care total spending. In addition, Figure 2 plots home health care spending per user, participation, and visits per user. In the figure, the series for participation and visits are shown in index form, where the base year (1982) is scaled to equal 100, and the two series are re-scaled so that they fit on the same axes. The text box in the top left gives the base-year values to convert the index to levels.
Expenditures per user, participation, and visits per user track each other very closely. Therefore, by a variety of metrics, the introduction of the IPS substantially reduced Medicare home health care activity.
III. Existing Studies
There are four strands in the existing literature that are particularly relevant. The first is a set of recent studies that have examined the impact of Medicaid, the largest source of long-term care insurance, on the demand for private long-term insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004; Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein, 2006) , housing wealth (Coe, 2007) , and homeownership (Greenhalgh-Stanley, 2008) using data from the 1990's drawn from the Health and Retirement Study. In general, they have concluded that the structure of Medicaid not only crowds out purchases of private long-term care insurance, but also affects end-of-life housing decisions.
With the exception of Greenhalgh-Stanley (2008) , those studies have relied only on cross-state variation in Medicaid eligibility rules, as there has been essentially very little recent time-series policy variation that has differed across states.
The second is a set of studies on the impact of other social insurance programs on the housing and living arrangements of the elderly. These include work investigating the impact on living arrangements of Social Security by Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1976) , McGarry and Schoeni 2000, Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) , and Costa (1999) on state Old Age Assistance programs. These studies have concluded that elderly living arrangements are quite responsive to Social Security benefits. In particular, Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) used year-of-birth variation in benefits from the Social Security "notch" and estimated elasticities of shared living with respect to benefits of −0.4 for all elderly and −1.3 for widowed elderly. Engelhardt (2008) examined the effects of Social Security on homeownership and headship decisions. He estimated elasticities of homeownership with respect to benefits of 0.5 for all elderly and 0.7 for widowed elderly, and elasticities of headship with respect to benefits of 0.1 for all elderly and 0.3 for widowed elderly. In combination, these studies suggest that elderly housing and living arrangements are quite responsive to social insurance benefits.
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A third strand has focused more narrowly on the impact of public home care subsidies on informal care and living arrangements. The most ambitious of these is Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996) who estimated a structural multinomial probit model of the impact of public subsidies and informal care on elderly living arrangements (nursing home, intergenerational, and independent living) using data from the 1982 , 1984 Surveys. Qualitatively, they found that increases in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the Medicaid home health care subsidy lowered the likelihood of shared living. However, quantitatively, our calculations based on their estimated marginal effects and sample means suggest very low elasticities of shared living with respect to these policy variables. Another important study is Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996) , who presented experimental evidence from the early 1980's on the impact on living arrangements from randomly assigned home care subsidies from the Channeling Experiment. Again, qualitatively, they found that increases in care subsidies lowered the likelihood of shared living, but the quantitative effects were quite small.
The final strand in the literature consists of specific studies on the impact of the changes to Medicare home health care from BBA97. While there are a number of studies in health services research on specific health-related aspects of the reform, there are two economic studies that are most closely related to ours. The first is McKnight (2006) , who studied the impact of BBA97 on Medicare home health care utilization, expenditure, and patient health, using individual data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). She exploited the fact that under IPS the weighted-average reimbursement cap at the agency level generated state-level variation in reimbursements and utilization as well. In particular, states with 1994 Medicare home health care expenditures below the Census-division average (which, of course, had agencies with below-average costs) saw their utilization rise after (relative to before) BBA97, compared to states with above-Census-division-average costs, where utilization was measured by the number of home visits per home health user. Using this variation in visits per user in a difference-in-difference regression framework, she found that while private out-of-pocket medical expenditures rose 22 cents for each dollar decline in Medicare expenditures, there was no discernable impact on elderly health.
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One potential explanation for this is that in response to the decline in the generosity of Medicare reimbursements for home health care, families substituted informal care for the purchase of market-based services from home health care agencies. 3 In our analysis below, we focus on a complement to informal care, shared living arrangements. After we commenced our analysis and received funding for this project from the Social Security Administration, we were made aware of an unpublished study by Orsini (2007) , who used methods similar to McKnight's and found a fairly substantial impact on shared living from the law change.
Orsini's study shares a number of features with our approach. Like ours, it examines the impact of the change in Medicare home health care benefits from BBA97 on living arrangements and even uses data from the CPS. That said, our analysis differs from hers in three ways. First, given that there is evidence from other studies that the elderly respond to social insurance benefits in their homeownership and headship decisions, we focus on a broader set of behavioral responses that include these outcomes. Second, because of measurement problems caused by the re-design of the CPS in 1994, we limit our analysis to 1995-2000. We discuss this in detail in the next section. Orsini (2007) 
IV. Data Construction
To identify the impact on housing and living arrangements from the reduction in home health benefits from BBA97, we draw data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) of March, 1996 through 2001. The primary advantage of the CPS is that the Housing Vacancy Survey, which is the official government source of homeownership rates, is a derivative of the 3 Unfortunately, McKnight could not study this, as informal care is not measured in the MCBS. Charles and Sevak (2005) and Mellor (2001) , among others, have studied substitution via informal care. 4 At the end of her analysis, Orsini presents a two-sample IV estimate of the impact of visits on living arrangements using her reduced-form estimates and McKnight's first-stage estimates. However, the IV strategy is not the focus of the analysis, as it is in our study. 8 CPS, so that the CPS is the ideal survey data source to study for homeownership. The primary disadvantage is that the CPS only samples non-institutionalized individuals, thus omitting elderly in nursing homes. To the extent that the decline in Medicare funding for home health care from BBA97 resulted in substitution from home-and community-based to nursing home living, use of the CPS might induce sample-selection bias. For a number of reasons, we do not believe this occurred. We discuss this in detail in section VII below. 5 Each March file is a cross-sectional, nationally representative sample of households.
Following Engelhardt (2008) , Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) and Gruber (2005, 2006) , we define "elderly" as all individuals age 65 and older, all of whom are Medicare eligible, and we make a distinction between families and households. Specifically In addition, we do not use data prior to 1995. Specifically, in 1994 the CPS moved to a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) format, updated its sampling frame based on the 9 1990 Census, introduced a new questionnaire, and instituted a number of other changes to the survey. Pitkin (1998) and Masnick, McArdle, and Belsky (1999) have analyzed the effect of these changes on measured trends in aggregate homeownership in the 1990s using the CPS.
They found that, concurrent with these changes, there appears to be an unusually large increase in the number of households and the homeownership rate as measured in the CPS between 1994 and 1996. In addition, Masnick et al. found that these increases differed by age, state, and marital status in a way that suggested the measured changes in homeownership before versus after 1994 in the CPS may have been spurious. Because it is imperative that the estimation results not be driven by these survey changes and because the IPS was introduced well after the CPS revisions, we limit our sample to data starting in 1996, using data from 1995-the first year after the survey revision-as a robustness check. We describe this more below.
Pooled across all years, there are 51,856 observations on elderly households and 57,607 observations on elderly families in the analysis dataset. There are more elderly families than households because some elderly individuals live in shared arrangements in which they are not the household head. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for selected variables in the analysis. 
V. Time-Series Evidence

VI. Regression Framework and Identification
There are two obvious drawbacks of the time-series analysis. First, the time series mask the substantial variation in home health care funding that occurred within states over time, due to the way the IPS was implemented. Second, other factors varying over time could be confounding those simple trends. Therefore, to better identify the impact of home health care benefits, we move to a regression framework using the micro-data.
Specifically, let i , a , s , d, and t index the household, age, state of residence, Census division, and calendar year, respectively, and x denote a vector that contains a constant and demographic and housing cost variables. Our focal regression specification is for shared living arrangements,
where D SHARED is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the elderly family is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise, and u is a disturbance term. The explanatory variable, y , is log of after-tax total income. Following Engelhardt (2008) , Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2005) and Gruber (2005, 2006) , it refers to the sum of money income The vector x includes dummy variables for the educational attainment of the head (high school diploma, some college, and college or advanced degree), marital status (married, widowed, and divorced in the pooled sample), white, and female. These explanatory variables control for any other trends in demographic characteristics that might be correlated with state expenditures and with housing and living arrangements. Following Engelhardt (2008) , the usercost measure is that of Green and Vandell (1998) Overall, we believe that expenditures per user is the best measure for our purposes. We will return to this when we discuss our robustness checks below.
Because b is expressed in logs, the key parameter, θ , in (1) is a semi-elasticity and measures the impact on the frequency of shared living from a doubling of the generosity of benefits. The central hypothesis is that increases in benefits have no impact on living arrangements, θ = 0 , versus the alternative that increases in benefits reduce the incidence of shared living, θ < 0 .
In principle, the parameters in (1) could be estimated with the micro-data using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of a linear probability model. In practice, unfortunately, there are two obvious sources of omitted-variable bias with such estimation. First, older individuals with a high demand for privacy, and, therefore, a low demand for shared living, might also have a high demand for long-term care benefits. Failure to adequately control for latent demand would lead to an omitted variable that would then be a confounder in the estimation, in this case, biasing the estimates away from zero, indicating a response to benefits that is too elastic.
Second, the incidence of shared living also depends on the supply of potential co-residents, such as children and, especially, daughters (Wolf and Soldo, 1988; Wolf, 1994 Wolf, , 1995 . If high benefit states also have a greater supply of potential co-residents (another confounder) then simple estimates would be biased toward zero, indicating a response to benefits that is too inelastic. 7
Overall, each of these problems would lead to biased and inconsistent regression-based estimates of the impact of home health benefits, although the net sign of the bias is unclear.
To circumvent these problems, we attempt to isolate the causal impact of home health benefits on housing and living arrangements by the use of an instrumental-variable estimation approach. Technically, IPS capped agency costs using the 75/25 weighted average described above. However, as McKnight (2006) stresses, the agency-level caps when aggregated up to the state level will imply state-level limitations on reimbursement after the law change, too.
Therefore, we define the instrument, Z, as . P
(3) s 7 The March CPS does not contain any fertility information that would allow the construction of the number of children or daughters as a measure of the potential supply of co-residents.
That is, before IPS, effectively actual costs were reimbursed; after IPS, reimbursements were capped by weighted average of the state's 1994 average payment (75% weight) and the 1994 Census division's average payment (25% weight). From the perspective of 1998-2000, the postlaw-change period, the 1994 payments are predetermined and, therefore, exogenous, so that, in principle, Z , is a valid instrument.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the 1994 home health care payments by Census division and state; column 2 shows the associated percentage change in the reimbursement cap from the movement to IPS. Across states, there is substantial variation in the generosity of reimbursement due to BBA97. States with above-Census-division-average payments in 1994 got their funding restricted under IPS. Those with below-Census-division-average payments in 1994 got the opposite.
Following Engelhardt (2008) , we specify the disturbance term, u , as
where ω is a vector of state effects, γ is a vector of calendar-year effects, κ is a vector of effects for the age of the head (by single year of age); φ is a linear year-of-birth trend; and υ is white noise. The full set of age dummies controls for differences across single years of age in housing and living arrangements; the state dummies control for any differences across states; the year dummies control for any general national time trends; and the year-of-birth trend controls for any linear trend in across years of birth. Therefore, after controlling for state and calendar
year, the IV estimates are identified by state-by-time variation in the instrument from changes in the reimbursement cap that began after 1997 due to the switch to IPS in the BBA97.
VII. Estimation Results
Panels A-D of Table 3 show the OLS, first-stage, reduced-form, and IV estimates, 
Robustness Checks
We performed a series of robustness checks. First, we altered the sample period from 1996-2000 to 1995-1999 Another important advantage of including these additional controls has to do with the concern we outlined above about the key explanatory variable, b , the log of Medicare home health expenditures per user: that our estimates thus far may be predicated on both differences in 16 benefit generosity and differences in input costs, primarily the cost of nurses' labor input.
Because the elasticity of substitution between nurses in home health care and nurses in skilled nursing facilities is very high, changes over time within states in labor costs that might have been contaminating the estimates of θ based on expenditures per user will now be accounted for by the inclusion of the additional Medicare control.
With these additional controls, the IV estimate in panel E of θ is −0.338 , significant at the 2.5% level. The implied elasticity is −1.13 . Again, these results suggest that elderly living arrangements are quite responsive to home health benefits.
Column 2 of the table gives a parallel set of estimation results for the other major marital group, married elderly. The married have a baseline IV estimated elasticity of shared living to home health benefits of −0.4 . Not surprisingly, this is much less elastic than the widowed and not statistically different than zero. Finally, column 3 of the table gives estimation results for all marital groups combined: the widowed, the married, as well as the divorced and never married elderly, for whom the sample sizes were too small for separate estimation. Across all elderly, the IV estimated elasticity of shared living to benefits ranges from −0.58 (in panel D) to −0.83 (in panel E) and is statistically different than zero at conventional levels of significance.
As outlined above, a potential limitation of our approach is that the CPS does not interview institutionalized individuals, thus omitting the elderly in nursing homes. To the extent that the decline in Medicare funding for home health care from BBA97 resulted in substitution from home-and community-based to nursing home living, use of the CPS might induce sampleselection bias. We do not believe this in an important concern for our results for three reasons.
First, if there was such substitution, we should observe a marked increase in nursing home use after 1997. Figure 6 A related potential source of selection bias is differential mortality. The CPS does not track individuals until death. To the extent that the decline in Medicare funding for home health care from BBA97 was associated with poorer health and relatively higher mortality for the elderly after (relative to before) the law change, then use of the CPS might induce sampleselection bias. Unfortunately, we have no direct way of assessing this in our data. However, we note that McKnight (2006) using the MCBS data found no discernable impact of the decline in home health care from BBA97 on elderly health (among those living) and no impact on mortality. Based on this evidence, we do not believe this in an important concern about our results.
Impact on Household Headship
Shared living can occur in two forms: a co-resident can become part of the elderly family's household, or the elderly family can become part of the co-resident's household. Table   4 examines the extent to which the changes in living arrangements found in Table 3 are associated with changes in household headship by the elderly. Specifically, Table 4 shows the IV estimates of the effect of benefits on the likelihood of headship for elderly families by marital status for a headship specification similar to (1):
where D HEAD is a dummy variable that equals one if the head of the elderly family is also the head of the household and zero otherwise. Each cell of the (Venti and Wise, 1989 , 1990 , 2000 , 2001 . To explore this, Table 5 shows the IV estimates of the effect of log real expenditures on homeownership for elderly households by marital status for a specification similar to (1) and (5):
where D OWN is a dummy variable that equals one if the elderly household is a homeowner and zero otherwise. Each cell of the For the two primary marital groups, widowed and married, there is little statistically significant evidence that greater home health care benefits raise elderly homeownership.
However, in the pooled sample in column 3, the sample size is sufficient such that there is enough precision to reject the null hypothesis of no effect in favor of the alternative that greater 19 home health care benefits raise homeownership at conventional levels of significance. Over all elderly, the IV estimated elasticity of homeownership with respect to benefits is about 0.22.
VIII. Summary and Caveats
There are three primary findings. First, the weight of empirical evidence from our analysis suggests that the changes in the supply of long-term care insurance through Medicare home health care benefits that occurred in the late 1990s had an economically important impact on elderly living arrangements. We estimate the elasticity of shared living to benefits to be −0.7 over all elderly and −1 for widowed elderly. Second, there seems to have been little impact on household headship among the elderly. This suggests that the bulk of the shared-living response occurred through co-residents living in elderly households. Finally, there is some weak evidence that increases in benefits raised homeownership.
Overall, living arrangements appear to quite responsive to home health care benefits.
Our estimates are much larger than those from the early 1980's by Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996) and Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996) -although the scope of the data and the methodologies vary substantially across these studies-but similar in magnitude to estimates from the Social Security literature (Michael, Fuchs, and Scott, 1976; McGarry and Schoeni, 2000; Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry, 2005; and Engelhardt, 2008 (Coe, 2007; Greenhalgh-Stanley, 2008) , on the demand for private long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) , and the interplay between housing wealth and the demand for long-term care insurance and annuities (Davidoff, 2008a (Davidoff, , 2008b are important directions for future research. 57,607 Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the family head is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors that are clustered on state are shown in parentheses. Income is measured in thousands of 2001 dollars. The specifications also include controls for dummy variables for single years of age from 65 to 92, calendar years 1996-2000, state fixed effects, a year-of-birth linear trend, the real user cost and the real value of the standard deduction. The elasticity of shared living with respect to the Medicare home health care expenditure per user is shown in curly brackets. It was calculated based on the parameter estimates shown in the table and sample means of the dependent variable shown in Table 1 .
(3) The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the family head is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors that are clustered on state are shown in parentheses. Income is measured in thousands of 2001 dollars. The specifications also include controls for dummy variables for single years of age from 65 to 92, calendar years 1996-2000, state fixed effects, a year-of-birth linear trend, the real user cost and the real value of the standard deduction. The elasticity of shared living with respect to the Medicare home health care expenditures per user is shown in curly brackets. It was calculated based on the parameter estimates shown in the table and sample means of the dependent variable shown in Table 1. 30 The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the family head is in a shared living arrangement and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors that are clustered on state are shown in parentheses. Income is measured in thousands of 2001 dollars. The specifications also include controls for dummy variables for single years of age from 65 to 92, calendar years 1996-2000, state fixed effects, a year-of-birth linear trend, the real user cost and the real value of the standard deduction. The elasticity of shared living with respect to the Medicare home health care expenditures per user is shown in curly brackets. It was calculated based on the parameter estimates shown in the table and sample means of the dependent variable shown in Table 1 
